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THE MINNEAPOLIS ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY
ORDINANCE: A VALID ASSERTION
OF CIVIL RIGHTS?
I. Introduction
Pornography' has become a social phenomenon of primary con-
cern.2 No longer the hidden vice of upper-class males,3 pornography
permeates our movie theatres, bookstores, newsstands, and telephone
lines. 4 Opponents of pornography, unable to contain its proliferation
through traditional means,' have turned to new and innovative av-
enues of redress.
In 1983, University of Minnesota law professor Catherine A.
MacKinnon 6 and feminist author Andrea Dworkin 7 drafted a novel8
anti-pornography ordinance to amend the Minneapolis Civil Rights
1. The word pornography is derived from the Greek pornographos, meaning
"the writing of harlots." H. HYDE, A HISTORY OF PORNOGRAPHY 1 (1964). It has
come to mean "a depiction (as in writing or painting) of licentiousness or lewdness:
a portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1767 (1976). For an explanation of how pornography
is defined by the Minneapolis ordinance, see infra notes 21-22 and accompanying
text.
2. The fact that a number of cities are showing great interest in the anti-
pornography ordinances demonstrates growing national concern. See infra note 16
and accompanying text.
3. See Elshtain, The New Porn Wars, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 25, 1984,
15, 15. "Pornography has always been with us, but now it seems to be coming
at us. Once the secret vice of upper-class males, porn is now the public vice of
anyone who chooses to share in it." Id.
4. Id. So-called "dial-a-porn" telephone services offer callers a recording of
a real or simulated sexual performance. A particular "dial-a-porn" service operated
by Carlin Communications, Inc. and Drake Publishers, Inc., received 180 million
phone calls in a twelve-month period, six times as many calls received by the
second most popular call-in number-horse racing results. Nat'l L.J., Nov. 26,
1984, at 10, col. 4.
5. Traditional means of stemming pornography include obscenity laws and
zoning legislation. For a discussion of these measures, see infra notes 167-73 and
accompanying text.
6. Catherine A. MacKinnon is a feminist lawyer, teacher, writer, and activist.
She is the author of SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979). See infra note 110 and accompanying text. Prior to her
arrival at the University of Minnesota School of Law, MacKinnon taught at Yale,
Harvard and Stanford law schools.
7. Andrea Dworkin is a feminist writer and activist who is the author of five
books, including PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981) and RIGHT-WING
WOMEN (1983). During the fall of 1983, Dworkin was a Visiting Professor in
Women's Studies and Law at the University of Minnesota.
8. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind.
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Code. 9 The ordinance, which defines pornography as a form of sex
discrimination against women,' 0 was passed by the Minneapolis City
Council by a seven to six vote on December 30, 1983"1 but was
vetoed by Minneapolis Mayor Donald Fraser on January 5, 1984.12
On May 1, 1984, Mayor William Hudnut III of Indianapolis
signed into law an ordinance based on the Minneapolis bill. 13 Less
than one hour later, first amendment proponents challenged the
Indianapolis ordinance in federal district court.' 4 On November 19,
1984, the federal district court of Indianapolis declared the ordinance
to be an unconstitutional abridgement of protected speech.' 5
The Minneapolis ordinance 16 asserts that pornography, through
1984). The defendant's argument that the state's interest in protecting women from
the degradation and humiliation caused by pornography is so compelling as to
condone the regulation of traditionally protected speech was an issue of first
impression in the courts. Id. at 1335. For a further discussion of the proponents'
theory, see infra notes 174-98 and accompanying text.
9. Ordinance to amend MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, chs. 139,
141 (1982) (passed Dec. 30, 1983; vetoed Jan. 5, 1984) [hereinafter cited as MIN-
NEAPOLIS ORDINANCE].
10. Id. See infra notes 20-46 and accompanying text for the language of the
Minneapolis ordinance.
11. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1984, at All, col. 1.
12. Id. Mayor Fraser stated that he vetoed the ordinance because it was "neither
appropriate nor enforceable within our cherished tradition and constitutionally
protected right of free speech." 70 A.B.A. J. 42 (March 1984). In response to the
Mayor's veto, Professor Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard sent a letter to Council
Member Sandra Hilary reprimanding the Mayor's veto as an abuse of our system
of government. Professor Tribe urged the Council to prevent an executive from
depriving the courts of an opportunity to adjudicate "what may eventually be
found to be the first sensible approach to an area which has vexed some of the
best legal minds for decades." Letter from Laurence Tribe to the Honorable Sandra
Hilary (Jan. 8, 1984), reprinted in 53 HENNEPIN LAW. 17 (Mar.-Apr. 1984).
13. Ordinance to amend INDIANAPOLIS CODE, ch. 16 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE]; see N.Y. Times, May 15, 1984, at A14, col. 1. Prior
to its enactment, the ordinance was adopted by the Indianapolis City-County Council
by a twenty-four to five vote. Id.
14. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1984, at A14, col. 1.
15. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1341-42 (S.D.
Ind. 1984).
16. Versions of the Minneapolis ordinance have been used by other municipalities.
The anti-pornography ordinance adopted in Indianapolis is based on the Minneapolis
ordinance. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. In addition, Suffolk County
proposed an ordinance that was based on the Minneapolis ordinance. SUFFOLK
COUNTY, N.Y. INTRO. RES. No. 1920-84, A Local Law to Limit Violence Against
Women § 2(a) (1984) [hereinafter cited as SUFFOLK COUNTY ORDINANCE]. See N.Y.
Times, Nov. 13, 1984, at B2, col. 1. The Suffolk County Ordinance was defeated
in the Suffolk County Legislature by a nine to eight vote. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30,
1984, at E8, col. 2. Although the original Suffolk bill followed the Minneapolis
bill, it was narrower in scope. MacKinnon and Dworkin opposed the bill because
it failed to include most of the pornography that they feel is harmful to women
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subordination and sex discrimination, violates the civil rights of women.' 7
Proponents of this civil rights approach argue that the state has a compel-
ling interest in protecting women from the harm inflicted by pornogra-
phy.'I The proponents further argue that the state's compelling interest
in protecting its citizens from civil rights violations overrides first amend-
ment challenge.' 9
This Note examines whether pornography violates women's civil
rights and whether the Minneapolis ordinance can withstand first
amendment challenge. This Note concludes that pornography neither
constitutes a civil rights violation nor falls within the traditional
categories of unprotected speech. Finally, this Note suggests that
the appropriate means to combat pornography is free speech-the
very means that the Minneapolis ordinance threatens to restrict.
1I. The Ordinance
A. Scope of the Ordinance
The Minneapolis ordinance defines pornography as the graphic
and children. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1984, at A26, col. 1. Suffolk County then
redrafted the ordinance to comply with these criticisms. See letter from Paul Sabatino
to Michael D'Andre, Suffolk County Legislator, Oct. 18, 1984 (copy available at
Fordham University School of Law).
Other cities, such as Detroit, Wichita and Madison have shown an interest in the
Minneapolis ordinance. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1984, at A14, col. 1. On July 16, 1985,
the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors adopted a similar anti-pornography
ordinance. Ordinance to amend Los ANGELES COUNTY CODE ch 13.17 (1985). Addi-
tionally, part of the Minneapolis ordinance has been used in a Senate bill called
the Pornography Victims Protection Act introduced by Senator Arlen Spector (R.Pa.)
in the last Congressional session. Blakely, Is One Woman's Sexuality Another
Woman's Pornography?, Ms., April 1985, at 38.
Hereinafter this Note will limit its discussion to the Minneapolis ordinance but
will cite to corresponding sections in the Indianapolis and Suffolk County ordinances
where applicable.
17. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. The civil rights approach to
pornography also seeks to protect men, children, or transsexuals who are hurt by
pornography in the same way that women are hurt. See infra note 22 and ac-
companying text.
18. Amicus Curiae Brief of Linda Marchiano at i, American Booksellers Ass'n
v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Linda Mar-
chianol. Proponents argue that pornography harms the status of women based upon
sex. Id. For a discussion of how pornography harms the status of women, see infra notes
46, 193-98 and accompanying text.
19. Id.; see also Memorandum to Minneapolis City Council by Catherine A.
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, December 26, 1983. See infra notes 151-208 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the first amendment. Opponents of the
ordinance argue that pornography neither falls within established categories of
unprotected speech nor warrants the creation of a new exception to free speech.
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sexual subordination of women 20 that entails one or more of the
following:
(i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things
or commodities; or
(ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or
humiliation; or
(iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual
pleasure in being raped; or
(iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up
or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or
(v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission; or
(vi) women's body parts-including but not limited to vaginas,
breasts, and buttocks-are exhibited, such that women are reduced
to those parts; or
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or
(viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or an-
imals; or
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury,
abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised,
or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual. 21
20. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 3 to add § 139.20(gg)(1). "Por-
nography is the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically depicted,
whether in pictures or in words ...... Id. In American Booksellers, the court
found the ordinance void for vagueness. American Booksellers, 598 F. Supp. at
1337-39. The court noted that the term "subordination of women" does not meet
the test stated by the Supreme Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford, which
requires, in part, that laws "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." American
Booksellers, 598 F. Supp. at 1338, quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108 (1972). The ordinance does not define the term "subordination of women."
As the federal district court of Indianapolis noted, it is unclear if "subordination
of women" refers to physical, social, psychological, emotional or any other form
of subordination. Id. Thus, the court held that the ordinance violates the basic
principle of due process because the prohibitions of the ordinance are not clearly
defined. Id. at 1339.
21. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 3 to add § 139.20(gg)(1)(i)-(ix).
The Indianapolis ordinance omitted the following sections found in the Minneapolis
ordinance: § 139.20(gg)(1)(i) (women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects,
things or commodities); § 139.20(gg)(1)(v) (women are presented in postures of
sexual submission); and § 139.20(gg)(1)(vii) (women are presented as whores by
nature). See INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-3(v). Even so, the court
in American Booksellers found the enumerated categories to be plagued with
constitutional problems of vagueness. American Booksellers, 598 F. Supp. at 1338-
39. The court noted that terms such as "degradation," "abasement," and "inferior"
are subjective terms which are inherently void for vagueness. Id. at 1339. Addi-
tionally, terms such as "in a context that make these conditions sexual" are not
defined in the ordinance. Id. The void-for-vagueness issue is outside the scope of
this Note.
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The ordinance creates the right for any aggrieved person22 alleging
violation of the ordinance to bring a civil action 23 against a maker,
seller, exhibitor, or distributor of objectionable pornography. 24 The
ordinance makes unlawful: (1) the trafficking of pornography;25 (2) coer-
Section 2(a)(i) of the Suffolk County Ordinance combines the categories in
§ 139.20(gg)(1)(i) and § 139.20(gg)(l)(iv) of the Minneapolis ordinance to read "women
are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities for domination,
conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or use, through postures or positions
of sexual servility or submission or display." SUFFOLK COUNTY ORDINANCE, supra
note 16, § 2(a)(i). Although the Suffolk County Ordinance contains all the other
categories of the Minneapolis ordinance, the Suffolk County ordinance also requires
that at least three of the descriptive categories are met. See SUFFOLK COUNTY
ORDINANCE, supra note 16, § 2(a).
Opponents of the ordinance suggest that the following movies would fall within
the ordinance's definition of pornography: "Dressed to Kill" (starring Michael
Caine and Angie Dickinson); "Star 80" (starring Mariel Hemingway and Cliff
Robertson); "Body Heat" (starring William Hurt and Kathleen Turner); "Swept
Away" (starring Giancarlo Giannini and Mariangela Melato); and "Last Tango in
Paris" (starring Marlon Brando and Maria Schneider). Memorandum of Law in
Support of Moving Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for Summary
Judgment at 20, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D.
Ind. 1984). In addition, opponents claim that books such as THE WITCHES OF
EASTWICK by John Updike, THE DELTA OF VENUS by Anais Nin, THE OTHER SIDE
OF MIDNIGHT by Sidney Sheldon, SCRUPLES by Judith Krantz, THE CARPETBAGGERS
by Harold Robbins, various James Bond novels by Ian Fleming, and most romance
("gothic") novels would be encompassed by the ordinance's definition of pornography.
Id. at 21. It was also suggested that the BIBLE contains certain passages which, to some,
may present "graphic sexually explicit subordination of women," as do many "classics"
such as Voltaire's CANDIDE. Amicus Curiae Brief of The Indiana Library Association
and the Indiana Library Trustee Association at 6, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
22. The ordinance provides a cause of action not only for women, but for
men, children or transsexuals who prove that they are injured by pornography in
the same way that women are injured. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, §
3 to add § 139.20(gg)(2); see also INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-
3(v); SUFFOLK COUNTY ORDINANCE, supra note 16, § 3(a). Opponents argue that
granting men, women, children and transsexuals a cause of action under an ordinance
that seeks to prevent sex discrimination against women is vague and "prevents
meaningful reliance on legislative purpose." Amici Curiae Brief of the American
Civil Liberties Union and the Indiana Civil Liberties Union at 26, American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984). However, the
court in American Booksellers did not challenge the ordinance on this ground.
This issue is outside the scope of this Note.
23. See infra notes 31, 32 and accompanying text for language in the statutes
giving victims of harm caused by pornography the right to bring a civil action.
24. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 4 to add § 139.40 (m)-(s). See
infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. For corresponding sections in the In-
dianapolis and Suffolk County ordinances, see INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra
note 13, §§ 16-17, 16-26, 16-27; SUFFOLK COUNTY ORDINANCE, supra note 16, §
3.
25. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 4 to add § 139.40(1). Subsection
(1) provides:
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cion of others into pornographic performances;2" and (3) the forcing of
(1) Discrimination by trafficking in pornography.
The production, sale, exhibition, or distribution of pornography is dis-
crimination against women by means of trafficking in pornography:
(1) City, state, and federally funded public libraries or private and public
university and college libraries in which pornography is available for
study, including on open shelves, shall not be construed to be trafficking
in pornography but special display presentations of pornography in said
places is sex discrimination.
(2) The formation of private clubs or associations for purposes of traf-
ficking in pornography is illegal and shall be considered a conspiracy to
violate the civil rights of women.
(3) Any woman has a cause of action hereunder as a woman acting
against the subordination of women. Any man or transsexual who alleges
injury by pornography in the way women are injured by it shall also
have a cause of action.
Id.
26. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 4 to add § 139.40(m). Subsection
(m) provides:
Coercion into pornographic performances. Any person, including trans-
sexual, who is coerced, intimidated, or fraudulently induced (hereafter,
"coerced") into performing for pornography shall have a cause of action
against the maker(s), seller(s), exhibitor(s) or distributor(s) of said por-
nography for damages and for the elimination of the products of the
performance(s) from the public view.
(1) Limitation of Action. This claim shall not expire before five years
have elapsed from the date of the coerced performance(s) or from the
last appearance or sale of any product of the performance(s), whichever
date is later;
(2) Proof of one or more of the following facts or conditions shall not,
without more, negate a finding of coercion:
(i) that the person is a woman; or
(ii) that the person is or has been a prostitute; or
(iii) that the person has attained the age of majority; or
(iv) that the person is connected by blood or marriage to anyone involved
in or related to the making of pornography; or
(v) that the person has previously had, or been thought to have had,
sexual relations with anyone, including anyone involved in or related to
the making of the pornography; or
(vi) that the person has previously posed for sexually explicit pictures
for or with anyone, including anyone involved in or related to the making
of the pornography at issue; or
(vii) that anyone else, including a spouse or other relative, has given
permission on the person's behalf; or
(viii) that the person actually consented to a use of the performance that
is changed into pornography; or
(ix) that the person knew that the purpose of the acts or events in
question was to make pornography; or
(x) that the person showed no resistance or appeared to cooperate actively
in the photographic sessions or in the sexual events that produced the
pornography; or
(xl) tnat the person signed a contract, or made statements affirming a
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pornography upon another person.27 Additionally, the ordinance gives
victims of any assault or physical attack caused by pornography a civil
remedy against the perpetrator and those involved in the production or
distribution of the pornography.2"
B. Procedural Devices Available Under the Ordinance
Like other laws prohibiting discrimination, 29 the ordinance allows
victims of pornography to adjudicate complaints through the ad-
ministrative apparatus of the Human Rights Commission30 and in
the courts." Under the procedural provisions of chapter 141 of the
willingness to cooperate in the production of pornography; or
(xii) that no physical force, threats, or weapons were used in the making
of the pornography; or
(xiii) that the person was paid or otherwise compensated.
Id.; see also INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-3(5); SUFFOLK COUNTY
ORDINANCE, supra note 16, § 3(b).
27. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 4 to add § 139.40(n). Section
139.40(n) provides: "(n) Forcing pornography on a person. Any woman, man,
child or transsexual who has pornography forced on him/her in any place of
employment, in education, in a home, or in any public place has a cause of action
against the perpetrator and/or institution." Id.; see also INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE,
supra note 13, § 16-5(6); SUFFOLK COUNTY ORDINANCE, supra note 16, § 3(c).
28. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 4 to add § 139.40(o). Section
139.40(o) provides:
(o) Assault or physical attack due to pornography. Any woman, man,
child, or transsexual who is assaulted, physically attacked or injured in
a way that is directly caused by specific pornography has a claim for
damages against the perpetrator, the maker(s), distributor(s), seller(s),
and/or exhibitor(s), and for an injunction against the specific pornog-
raphy's further exhibition, distribution, or sale. No damages shall be
assessed (A) against maker(s) for pornography made, (B) against dis-
tributor(s) for pornography distributed, (C) against seller(s) for pornog-
raphy sold, or (D) against exhibitor(s) for pornography exhibited prior
to the enforcement date of this act.
Id.; see also INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-3(7); SUFFOLK COUNTY
ORDINANCE, supra note 16, § 3(c).
29. Memorandum to Minneapolis City Council from Catherine A. MacKinnon
and Andrea Dworkin, Dec. 26, 1983, at 3.
30. MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 141 (1982). The pre-existing ad-
ministrative procedure would be followed. See infra notes 32-43 for a discussion
of the pre-existing procedure. However, MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, §
1 to add § 141.50(1)(3), adds the following provision: "(3) Pornography. The
hearing committee or court may order relief, including the removal of violative
material, permanent injunction against the sale, exhibition or distribution of violative
material or any other relief deemed just and equitable, including reasonable attorney's
fees." Id.; see also INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-7.
31. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 2 to amend § 141.60. Section (2)
provides that § 141.60 be amended as follows:
141.60 Civil Action, judicial review and enforcement.
(a) Civil actions.
19851
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Minneapolis Code of Ordinances,3 2 a person alleging discrimination
must file a complaint with the director of the Minneapolis Civil
Rights Commission,33 who is authorized to conduct an investigation
to determine whether a violation has occurred."' If probable cause is found
to exist, the director will seek to correct the violation through informal
conciliation." If conciliation proves unsuccessful, the complaint is referred
to the Civil Rights Commission for a public hearing36 in which a desig-
nated hearing committee" reviews the complaint and prescribes relief.3"
If the respondent fails to correct the discriminatory practice proscribed
by the committee, judicial enforcement may be sought.39 The hearing
committee or the court may: (1) require removal of the pornography; °
(1) An individual alleging a violation of this ordinance may bring a civil
action directly in court.
(2) A complainant may bring a civil action at the following times:
(i) Within forty-five (45) days after the director, a review committee or
a hearing committee has dismissed a complaint for reasons other than
a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is a signator; or
(ii) After forty-five (45) days from the filing of a verified complaint if
a hearing has not been held pursuant to section 141.50 or the department
has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the complainant
is a signator. The complainant shall notify the department of his/her
intention to bring a civil action, which shall be commenced within ninety
(90) days of giving the notice. A complainant bringing a civil action
shall mail, by registered or certified mail, a copy of the summons and
complaint to the department and upon receipt of same, the director shall
terminate all proceedings before the department relating to the complaint
and shall dismiss the complaint.
No complaint shall be filed or reinstituted with the department after
a civil action relating to the same unfair discriminatory practice has been
brought unless the civil action has been dismissed without prejudice.
Id.
32. MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 141 (1984).
33. MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 141.50(a) (1984). The complaint must
be filed within six months of the incident that gave rise to the complaint. Id.; see
also INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-17.
34. MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 141.50(b) (1984); see also INDIANAPOLIS
ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-24.
35. MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 141.50(e) (1984); see also INDIANAPOLIS
ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-24.
36. MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 141.50(h) (1984).
37. The committee must be formed within 30 days of the receipt of the complaint
by the Commission. The chairperson must choose three members of the Commission,
one of whom is an attorney, to serve as the committee. Id.; see also INDIANAPOLIS
ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-26.
38. MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 141.50(h) (1984).
39. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 2 to amend § 141.60. See supra
note 31 for the text of this section. See also INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note
13, § 16-27.
40. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 1 to add § 141.50(l)(3); see supra
note 30 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XIII
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(2) permanently enjoin the sale,"' exhibition or distribution of the
pornography;"' or (3) give "any other relief deemed just and equitable." 3
C. Purpose of the Ordinance
The legislative purpose of the ordinance is to prevent and prohibit
the discriminatory practices encouraged by pornography."4 The Min-
neapolis City Council found that pornography is central in creating
and perpetuating the unequal position of the sexes. 45 The City Coun-
cil's Special Findings on Pornography state:
The bigotry and contempt [pornography] promotes, with the
acts of aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities for
equality of rights in employment, education, property rights, public
accommodations and public services; create public harassment and
private denigration; promote injury and degradation such as rape,
battery and prostitution and inhibit just enforcement of laws
against these acts; contribute significantly to restricting women
from full exercise of citizenship and participation in public life,
including in neighborhoods; damage relations between the sexes;
and undermine women's equal exercise of rights to speech and
action guaranteed to all citizens under the Constitutions and laws
of the United States and the state of Minnesota. 46
III. What are "Civil Rights?"
The Minneapolis ordinance defines pornography as a violation of
41. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 1 to add § 141.50(l)(3).
42. Id.
43. Id. The hearing committee or the court may grant reasonable attorney's
fees if they deem them to be just and equitable. Id.
44. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 1 to amend § 139.10 § (b). The
ordinance adds part (4) which states that the public policy of the City of Minneapolis
and the purpose of title 7 is "[tlo prevent and prohibit all discriminatory practices
of sexual subordination or inequality through pornography." Id.; see also INDI-
ANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-1(b); SUFFOLK COUNTY ORDINANCE,
supra note 16, § (1). MacKinnon and Dworkin stated that "[t]he purpose of the
[Minneapolis] ordinance is to make available an effective remedy . . . [for] the
systematic discrimination, the condoned brutality, and the glorified debasement that
defines the condition of an entire group of people." Memorandum to City Council,
supra note 29, at 3.
45. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 1 to amend § 139.10(a); see also
INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-1(a); SUFFOLK COUNTY ORDINANCE,
Supra note 13, § 1.
46. MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 1 to add § 139.10(a)(1); see also
INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 13, § 16-1(a)(2); SUFFOLK COUNTY ORDINANCE,
supra note 16, § 1.
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women's civil rights. 47 This argument provides a case of first impres-
sion in the courts. 41 Since present civil rights legislation does not
encompass pornography, the courts must determine whether the
concept of civil rights should be extended to afford protection to
the women harmed by pornography.
A. The Early History of Civil Rights
The notion of protected "civil rights ' 49 did not evolve until the
Reconstruction Period of the late 1860's.0 After the Civil War,
Congress turned its attention from the slavery debate to the abuse
47. The purpose of the ordinance, to prevent discriminatory practices, is cast
in civil rights terminology. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. Proponents
analogize the sex discrimination caused by pornography to the advocacy of the
"separate but equal" doctrine in a civil rights context. See Brief of Linda Mar-
chiano, supra note 18, at 42-43. Segregation expresses an idea that is protected
under the first amendment but is not constitutionally protected behavior. Id.
Proponents of the Minneapolis ordinance argue that protection of the idea that
women are inferior to men should not extend protection to the sexual subordination
of women. Id. However, in American Booksellers, the court concluded that this
"content-versus-conduct" approach is not persuasive and is contrary to the first
amendment. American Booksellers, 598 F. Supp. at 1330. See infra notes 151-208
for a discussion of the ordinance in regard to first amendment issues.
48. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
49. Civil rights refer to those rights commonly denied people on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. See Maslow & Robison, Civil Rights
Legislation and the Fight for Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 363
n.1 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Maslow & Robison]. Civil rights differ from civil
liberties, which are the personal rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitution,
specifically the first ten amendments. Id.
50. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH.
L. REV. 1323, 1323 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Gressman]; Maslow & Robison,
supra note 49, at 365. Arthur J. Goldberg, Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, suggested that there are several reasons why equality, a primary
goal of the founding fathers, was not expressly stated in the Constitution prior to
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. Goldberg, Equality and Governmental
Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 205, 206-07 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg].
First, equality is implied throughout the Constitution in its guarantee of a Republican
form of government ruled by the people and not by a king. Id. at 206. Second,
the framers might naturally have assumed that equality was included in the term
"liberty" which is incorporated in the preamble and in the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. Id. at 207. Third, since many states incorporated equality
in their constitutions, it may have been deemed unnecessary to include it on a
federal level. Id. Finally, the most prevailing reason for the lack of civil rights
activity prior to this time was the political and economic popularity of slavery. I
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (B. Schwartz, ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as Schwartz]; see Gressman, supra, at 1323; Maslow & Robison, supra note
49, at 367; Goldberg, supra, at 207. The pre-Civil War period was characterized
by the Dred Scott philosophy that blacks were not citizens under the Constitution.
Gressman, supra, at 1325; see Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856).
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of state power in the areas of rights and liberties. 1 At that point,
federal protection of rights and liberties began to develop.
On February 1, 1865, Congress adopted and submitted to the
states the thirteenth amendment5 2 which abolished slavery and in-
voluntary servitude in the United States and gave Congress the power
to enforce this prohibition." Despite congressional action, the South
endeavored to keep blacks enslaved through the so-called Black
Codes.14 In response, Congress, over President Johnson's veto, 5
passed the first civil rights statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (the
1866 Act).5 6
The 1866 Act, which treats civil rights to mean freedom from
acts of racial prejudice, 7 states that all persons born in the United
51. See Gressman, supra note 50, at 1323; Schwartz, supra note 50, at 8. Until
the end of the Civil War, the states determined and protected the rights of their
citizens, since the Bill of Rights was binding only on the federal government and
not on the state governments. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 8-9.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The thirteenth amendment states:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
Id.
53. Id. The thirteenth amendment was the first protection of personal rights
directed at the states and private individuals, as well as the federal government.
Gressman, supra note 50, at 1324. Ratification of the thirteenth amendment was
completed on December 18, 1865. Id. For a further discussion of the issues
surrounding the adoption of the thirteenth amendment, see tenBroek, Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951).
54. Maslow & Robison, supra note 49, at 366-67. The Black Codes were a
variety of laws enacted in the South between 1865 and 1867, which restricted the
rights of blacks to participate in society. Id. For example, Black Codes included
laws that barred blacks from certain trades or businesses without special licenses
and restricted their rights to rent and lease land outside cities. Id. at 367.
55. 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 405-13 (1897).
56. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). See generally CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1857-61 (passage in House of 1866 Act over President Johnson's veto); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1801-09 (passage in Senate of 1866 Act over President
Johnson's veto).
57. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 states:
CHAP.XXXI - An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in
their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of Their Vindication
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the
United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians
not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and
such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to
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States are citizens of the United States, and each citizen, regardless
of race or color, shall have the same rights as white citizens."
Questions arose as to whether the 1866 Act granted power to Congress
that was reserved to the states.5 9 To ensure the constitutionality of
the 1866 Act, 6° Congress, on July 13, 1866, proposed the fourteenth
amendment which was ratified on July 21, 1868.61 The fourteenth
amendment, which guarantees equal protection and due process of
law for all people born or naturalized in the United States, 62 became
the predominant rationale for civil rights decisions by the United
States Supreme Court.
63
Other Reconstruction Period civil rights measures followed im-
mediately, each connecting civil rights to acts of racism. On February
26, 1869, Congress submitted to the states the fifteenth amendment,
64
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwith-
standing.
Id.
58. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
59. See Gressman, supra note 50, at 1328-29. In People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198,
220-21 (1870), the court found the 1866 Act to be unconstitutional because it
contravened the powers reserved to the state under the United States Constitution.
60. See Gressman, supra note 50, at 1327-28 (provisions and goals of 1866 Act
were to be incorporated into constitutional provision to guarantee that federal
government would have power to protect individual rights of citizens).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment guarantees citizenship
to all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and declares that the states
shall provide due process of law and equal protection of the laws to all of their
people. Id. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress the power to
enforce the provisions of the amendment through appropriate legislation. Id. § 5;
see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. For example, prior to the fourteenth amendment,
those people who were born and remained in the District of Columbia were not
United States citizens. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872).
63. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 616-17 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter cited as NOwAK]. Nowak states that the fourteenth amendment
is difficult to interpret in light of the competing goals of Congress during the
Reconstruction Period. Id. at 619-20. Thus, the history provides few guidelines on
how the fourteenth amendment applies to modern civil rights issues. Id. at 620.
Nowak suggests that, at best, the Congressional debates on the fourteenth amendment
demonstrate four goals of Congress: (1) to guarantee protection of natural civil
liberties from abuses by the state; (2) to help equalize the rights of black and
white Americans; (3) to provide Congress with broad powers of enforcement; and
(4) to localize the protection of civil rights in the federal government. Id. at 621.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. The fifteenth amendment, ratified in 1870, states:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
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which prohibited denial of the right to vote on the basis of race.
65
Next, Congress passed the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, 66
which created criminal penalties against those who deprived blacks
of the rights enumerated in the 1866 Act. 67 The Anti-Ku Klux Klan
Act, 68 enacted on April 20, 1871, outlawed conspiracies to deprive
any person of equal protection or privileges and immunities under
the law. 69 The final Reconstruction act, enacted on March 1, 1875,10
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race or color in public
places and in the selection of juries.7'
B. Judicial Interpretation of Early Civil Rights Measures
Judicial interpretation of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments 72 limited what seemed to be the far-reaching scope of
the constitutional civil rights guarantees. In the Slaughter House
Cases,73 the United States Supreme Court held, in a five to four
decision, that the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
Id.
65. Id.
66. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870), amended 16 Stat. 433 (1871).
67. See Gressman, supra note 50, at 1334. The 1870 Act reenacted the 1866
Act under the premise that any constitutional infirmities of the 1866 Act were
eradicated by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1333-34; see supra note 60 and
accompanying text. The 1866 Act was then codified in R.S. §§ 1977, 1978 (1874),
now 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 n.28
(1968).
68. 17 Stat. 13 (1871), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1982). The Anti-
Ku Klux Klan Act provides, in part:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That any person who, under
color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
any State, shall subject or cause to be subjected, any person within the
jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall,
any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in
any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress ....
17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871).
69. Id.
70. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
71. Id.
72. These three amendments are commonly referred to as the Civil War Amend-
ments. See NowAK, supra note 63, at 616.
73. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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amendment did not protect the rights of citizens relating solely to
state citizenship.7 4 Under this decision, states could limit personal
liberties that were not decidedly federal.7 1
In United States v. Cruikshank,7 6 the Supreme Court stated that
the first section of the fourteenth amendment 77 applied exclusively
to instances of state action.78 The Cruikshank decision thereby re-
moved civil rights violations by private parties from the scope of
constitutionally guaranteed protection.7 9 Various provisions of civil
rights statutes eroded under the Cruikshank decision.80 Finally, in
1883, the Supreme Court held in the Civil Rights Cases8 that the
enforcement provisions of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments82
did not authorize Congress to redress racial discrimination by private
74. Id. at 81-82.
75. Id. at 79-81. The Slaughter House Cases were not civil rights cases; they
involved a state law that granted a monopoly to a corporation in the slaughter of
animals. However the effect of the decision was felt by civil rights advocates,
because much of the civil rights legislation relied on a broader interpretation of
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Gressman,
supra note 50, at 1338; see also infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
76. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
77. The first section of the fourteenth amendment provides:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554-55.
79. Id. (Court found unconstitutional federal criminal indictments under con-
spiracy section of 1870 ,Act as applied to private persons who were not abridging
federally guaranteed rights); see also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883)
(Court declared void criminal conspiracy section of Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871
which made conspiracies by private persons to lynch an offense).
80. In United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876), the Court held that two
sections of the 1870 Act, which provided protection for all citizens in their right
to vote, were unconstitutional under the fifteenth amendment because the scope
of these sections was not confined to interferences based on race, color, or prior
servitude as defined in the amendment. Id. at 220-22. In James v. Bowman, 190
U.S. 127 (1903), the Court struck down § 5 of the 1870 Act (§ 5507 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States), which prohibited bribery in elections, because it
went beyond the fifteenth amendment state action provisions and sought to reach
private persons. Id. at 139.
81. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
82. See supra note 61. Section 5 states: "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
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individuals, 3 thereby further diminishing the efficacy of the civil
rights statutes.
In addition to limiting the Civil War Amendments 4 to discrimi-
nation by state action, the Supreme Court suggested that the scope
of these amendments was limited to racial discrimination.85 In 1873,
Justice Miller, in his delivery of the opinion of the Supreme Court
in the Slaughter House Cases,8 6 stated that although the fourteenth
amendment was not restricted to discrimination against blacks, it
was highly unlikely that the amendment would be found to protect
against any other form of discrimination.8 7 In 1873, the Supreme
Court also decided Bradwell v. Illinois88 in which the Court upheld
the state's refusal to grant a woman a license to practice law. The
three concurring justices in the Bradwell decision implied that they
would not apply the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment to protect the rights of women in the workplace.8 9
C. Twentieth Century Developments in the Civil Rights
Movement
Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,90 congres-
83. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (Court held unconstitutional first two sections of
Civil Rights Act of 1875, which outlawed discrimination based on race in use of
public accommodations and recreational facilities; Court held that, under fourteenth
amendment, private proprietors were free to discriminate on basis of race).
84. See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments.
85. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
86. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
87. Id. The Supreme Court stated:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way
of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It
is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong
case would be necessary for its application to any other.
Id. at 81.
88. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
89. Id. at 141. The concurring justices were clearly impressed by the subject
matter of the case. The plaintiff, Myra Bradwell, challenged the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision denying her a license to practice law because she was female.
Justice Bradley, in his concurrence in which Justices Swayne and Field joined,
stated that females should not have the right to pursue all jobs because:
[mian is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of
the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as
well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that
which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.
Id.
90. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
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sional activity in the civil rights area lay dormant for over three-
quarters of a century. Then in the late 1950's, the so-called Second
Reconstruction Period9' of civil rights began when Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1957.92 Over the next three decades, Congress
passed four more civil rights acts, 93 of which the Civil Rights Acts
of 196494 and 196591 have been as far reaching as any of the
enactments of the post-Civil War Reconstruction Period.9 6 In par-
ticular, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the 1964 Act)97 increased the
protected rights of blacks and expanded the definition of civil rights
to protect against discrimination based on religion, national origin,
and finally, sex.98
Title V1199 of the 1964 Act was, at that time, the only federal
statute to specifically outlaw discrimination on the basis of sex.'0 0 Title
VII states that it is unlawful for any employer to refuse to hire, dismiss,
or otherwise discriminate against a person because of race, religion, na-
tional origin, or sex.' 0 ' The Supreme Court held, in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.,'I" that the scope of Title VII's prohibitions against sex
91. M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE 1-64 (1968). The author equates the
second surge of civil rights activity to the complex social changes of the period,
including the South's economic problems of the 1930's and the development of
urban poverty in the 1960's as blacks moved to the cities. Id. at 16-32.
92. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957).
93. The four civil rights acts following the Civil Rights Act of 1957 are: (1)
The Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (1960); (2) The
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); (3) The Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); (4) The Civil Rights
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
94. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
95. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
96. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 837 (B. Schwartz,
ed. 1970). The Civil Rights Act of 1964, as enacted, contains eleven titles. Title
II (barring racial discrimination in public accommodations which affect commerce),
Title VI (banning racial discrimination in all programs funded with federal as-
sistance), and Title VII (banning discrimination in employment practices on the
basis of race, religion, or sex) have had the greatest ramifications. Id. at 1018-20.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 bans those acts, such as voting qualifications, that
deny or abridge the right of any citizen to vote due to race or color. 79 Stat. 437
(1965).
97. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. The 1964 Act is codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1982).
98. Id. However, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982), is the only
section of the .1964 Act to ban discrimination based on sex.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
100. Id. Although Title VII bans discrimination on the basis of sex, it permits
discrimination in hiring by sex where there "is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or en-
terprise . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
102. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
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discrimination is not confined to overt discrimination based solely on
gender; Title VII also prohibits discrimination against a subsection of
the male or female class.' 3 Therefore, sex discrimination can refer to
discrimination based upon characteristics that affect the employment op-
portunities of one sex but not the other.'" 4
Although sex discrimination was introduced into the civil rights
context in 1964, the Supreme Court did not invalidate a statute on
those grounds until 1971. In that year, the Court held, in Reed v.
Reed,105 that the sex preference established by an Idaho statute
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.10 6
The Idaho statute stated that when otherwise equally qualified persons
sought to administer an estate, preference was to be given to males
over females. 10 7 Although the Supreme Court held that the Idaho
statute constituted sex discrimination, it declined to elevate gender-
based discrimination to the level of "suspect classification."' 8 While
103. Id. at 544. The Supreme Court held that the company's refusal to hire
mothers of young children but not fathers of young children constituted sex
discrimination under Title VII. Although not all women were excluded from
employment but only women with small children, the company rule violated Title
VII because gender was a determination. Other courts have similarly concluded
that discrimination based only partly on gender violates Title VII. See Willingham
v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F. 2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) ("sex
plus" discrimination which classifies employees on basis of sex, plus an ostensibly
neutral characteristic, violates Title VII); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444
F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (7th Cir.) (United's no-marriage rule for stewardesses dis-
criminated on basis of sex because it was not applied to male employees), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971); see also 110 CONG. REC. 2728, 13,825 (Congress specifically
rejected amendment to Act which would have limited prohibition against sex dis-
crimination to discrimination based solely on sex). Such a limitation, it was felt,
would debilitate the Act. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 n.4; Willingham, 507 F.2d
at 1089. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 337-
60 (1976) (discussion of "sex plus" discrimination) [hereinafter cited as SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN].
104. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 103, at 337.
105. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
106. Reed, 404 U.S. at 74. The Supreme Court unanimously declared uncon-
stitutional an Idaho statute that gave men preference over women to administer
estates. Id. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment does not deny states
power to treat different classes of persons differently, but rather denies states power
to legislate that different treatment be accorded to people of different classes on
the basis of criteria unrelated to the objectives of the statute at hand. Id. at 75-
76.
107. Reed, 404 U.S. at 73. Section 15-314 of the Idaho Code provided that
"[o]f several persons claiming and equally entitled [under §15-312] to administer,
males must be preferred to females, and relatives of the whole to those of the
half blood." IDAHO CODE tit. 15, § 314 (1948).
108. See NOWAK, supra note 63, at 718-19. The "strict judicial scrutiny" test
arose from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The Korematsu Court held that classifications
19851
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the justices differ as to the proper classification of sex-based dis-
crimination, 1°9 the Supreme Court maintains that sex-based discrim-
ination violates the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth
amendment."10
based on race or national origin were "suspect" or likely to be based on an
impermissible purpose. Id. at 216. These classifications would be subject to rigid
judicial review, and would be upheld only if required by "public necessity." Id.
Thus, the Supreme Court established the strict scrutiny test which held that some
restrictions on liberty of "suspect" classes will be allowed where they are required
to satisfy "compelling" or "overriding" interests. NOWAK, supra note 63, at 633.
Three standards of review have been established in equal protection analysis. In
addition to strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has employed a "rational relation"
test whereby a classification is allowed to stand if it bears a rational relation to
a valid governmental end, and an "intermediate tier" analysis which falls somewhere
between the two. NOWAK, supra note 63, at 590-99. See also infra note 109 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the intermediate tier approach. For a discussion
of the three tests, see generally Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEORGETOWN
L.J. 1071 (1974).
In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Supreme Court did not review the
Idaho statute according to strict scrutiny analysis. Rather, the Court found the
statute unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause while seeking
to reduce the workload of the courts. Id. at 76-77. In essence, the Supreme Court
questioned whether the differences in sex were rationally related to a permissible
objective of the statute. NOWAK, supra note 63, at 719.
109. In the five-year period following Reed, the Supreme Court could not agree
on the appropriate standard of review to be used in sex-classification cases. NOWAK,
supra note 63, at 719. The standards of review included the traditional rational
relation test and the strict scrutiny test. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
In addition, since 1976 the Supreme Court has used an intermediate standard of
review which applies a "substantial relationship to an important interest" test. See
NOWAK, supra note 63, at 722. The scope of this test is unclear; it neither prohibits
all sex-based classifications nor sets standards for determining the importance of
opposing governmental interests. See NOWAK, supra note 63, at 722-23. Rather,
the test allows each justice to weigh the interest the government asserts to justify
the sex-based classification and to determine if the interest and the classificaton
are reasonably related. See id.
The intermediate tier analysis has been used by the Supreme Court in a number
of "property-allocation cases." See e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979)
(Social Security Act providing financial support due to unemployment of fathers
but not mothers held invalid); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (state law providing
that state court could grant alimony payments only from husbands to wives found
unconstitutional). For a discussion of intermediate tier analysis, see generally Blatt-
ner, The Supreme Court's "Intermediate" Equal Protection Decisions: Five Im-
perfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1981);
Emden, Intermediate Tier Analysis of Sex Discrimination Cases: Legal Perpetuation
of Traditional Myths, 43 ALB. L. REV. 73 (1978).
110. In Reed, the Supreme Court stated that granting a mandatory preference
to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish a non-
compelling state interest, "is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
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Soon thereafter, Congress passed sex discrimination legislation to
protect women in the areas of education,"' equal pay, 12 and housing." 3
In 1976, the United States District Court of the District of Columbia
held that sexual harassment violates Title VII of the 1964 Act." 4
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... 
404 U.S. at 76-77.
In SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION,
author Catherine MacKinnon analyzes the Supreme Court's approaches to sex
discrimination cases along two lines: a concept of sex differences, whereby differing
treatment is tied to biological traits (the differences approach) and an approach
that treats women as unequal (the inequality approach). C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979) [hereinafter
cited as SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN]. MacKinnon cites General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), in which the Supreme Court alluded to both
approaches. SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra, at 103. The majority
in Gilbert held that excluding pregnancy from disability coverage was not discrim-
ination simply because the coverage was not all inclusive. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133-
36. Yet in his dissent, Justice Brennan recognized that a different result might be
reached if the Court, under an inequality approach, focused on the fact that only
women are subjected to a potential loss of income due to this disability. Id. at
147-48.
Although MacKinnon acknowledges that no legal doctrine exists which fully
accepts the inequality approach, certain existing doctrines are akin to it, including
the possible categorization of sex as a suspect classification, as four justices did
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (rule allowing only male members
of uniformed service to claim spouse as dependent held unconstitutional), and the
prohibition of practices which, though seemingly neutral, have a discriminatory
impact upon one sex. SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra, at 116-
17.
The inequality approach goes beyond the obvious forms of discrimination and
attacks the social structure which cumulatively subordinates women through negative
stereotypes and second-class status. Id. at 102-03.
111. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686
(1982) and Health, Education and Welfare Title IX regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 24137
(1975) (codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 86) prohibit schools which discriminate on the
basis of sex from receiving federal funding.
112. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended by the Education Amendments
of 1972, prohibits pay differentials on the basis of sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982)
(amending Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
113. Titles VIII and IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the 1968 Act) and Title
V of the National Housing Act as amended by Title VIII of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, commonly known as the Fair Housing Act,
prohibit sex discrimination in housing. Specifically, the Fair Housing Act prohibits
discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of housing. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3606
(1982). In addition, it prohibits intimidation, based on sex discrimination, of the
sellers, purchasers, financiers, or inhabitants of a dwelling, 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1982).
The National Housing Act prohibits sex discrimination regarding the lending of
financial assistance or services related to the selling or renting of dwellings. 12
U.S.C. § 1735f-5 (1982).
114. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). The court held that
sexual harassment was treatment "based on sex" within the meaning of Title VII.
Id. at 659; see also Garber v. Saxon Business Products, 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir.
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In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 15
published guidelines which expressly recognize sexual harassment as
a form of employment discrimination. 116
The legislative history concerning the intended scope of the sex
discrimination provisions is sparse;"17 therefore, courts have inter-
preted Title VII according to the traditional equal protection analysis."'
1977) (complaint alleging employer policy of acquiesence in subjecting female em-
ployees to sexual advances of male supervisors stated cause of action under Title
VII).
115. Title VII is enforced and administered by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
116. 45 Fed. Reg. 7-1, 676 (1980), codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. In part,
the guidelines state:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title
VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly
a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to
or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
117. "The legislative history of title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination is
notable primarily for its brevity." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143,
reh. denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1976). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) admitted that further investigation was necessary to determine the parameters
of sex discrimination. 30 Fed. Reg. 14927 (1965). In Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), Justice Goldberg commended
Congress for not specifying what constitutes discrimination, because its definition
is ever changing: "[Congress] pursued the path of wisdom by being unconstrictive,
knowing that constant change is the order of our day and that the seemingly
reasonable practices of the present can easily become the injustices of the morrow."
Id. at 238.
118.
The concept of "discrimination" ... was well known at the time of
the enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the fourteenth
amendment for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history of
judicial construction. When Congress makes it unlawful for an employer
to "discriminate . . . because of . . . sex . . . " without further expla-
nation of its meaning, we should not readily infer that it meant something
different from what the concept of discrimination has traditionally meant.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145; cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 549 (1974) (without evidence to prove otherwise, Congress cannot be held to
have intended to repeal Indian preference of Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 193 (1922) (Section 2169 of
Revised Statutes regarding immigration confined to white persons was not changed
by Naturalization Act of 1906; if Congress intended to change rule so well and
long established, it would have done so explicitly). The Supreme Court has stated
that the purpose of Congress enacting Title VII was "the removal of artificial,
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Under this analysis, the courts have held that sexual harassment
exists not only when an employee alleges direct employment con-
sequences stemming from sexual advances'19 but also when an em-
ployer creates or condones a discriminatory work environment. 120
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate in-
vidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification."
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (requirement of high school
diploma and intelligence tests which were not used to measure ability was discrim-
inatory).
MacKinnon suggests that sexual harassment can be defined as sex discrimination
under both the "differences approach" and the "inequality approach" taken by
the United States Supreme Court in sex-discrimination cases. See SExUAL HARASS-
MENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 110, at 215. Under the inequality approach,
the sexuality of the sexes, due to societal forces, is treated differently. Thus, "when
women's sexuality is treated differently from men's sexuality, similarly situated
women and men will have been differentially treated, to women's comparative
disadvantage, and that is sex discrimination." See id. at 215-16. On a differences
approach, men are not placed in comparable positions to women when faced with
identical sexual harassment. See id. at 216.
119. Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) (employee who was
fired after refusing supervisor's demand for sexual favors had valid Title VII claim
against employer); Tompkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-
49 (3rd Cir. 1977) (female employee whose continued employment was conditioned
upon her submission to sexual advances of male supervisor had cognizable claim
of sex discrimination under Title VII); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 994-95
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (female employee whose job was abolished in retaliation for her
refusal to submit to sexual advances of male supervisor had claim of violation of
Title VII).
120. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In Bundy, the
plaintiff suffered sexual intimidation by a co-worker and supervisors. The supervisors
created the impression that her refusals interfered with her promotion. The court
held that "conditions of employment" include the psychological and emotional
work environment, thereby including the sexually stereotyped insults and demeaning
positions suffered by the plaintiff in violation of Title VII. Id.
Title VII prohibits any form of employment discrimination. It prohibits "disparate
treatment," which is intentional, unfavorable treatment of an employee based upon
an impermissible criterion such as sex. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (in disparate treatment discrimination, employer treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, religion, color, national
origin, or sex). Title VII also prohibits those seemingly neutral practices which
have a "disparate impact" and are not a business necessity. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) (requirement of high school diploma and passing
of intelligence tests which were not used to measure ability discriminated against
blacks when used as condition of employment).
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court
delineated the order and allocation of proof required in disparate treatment cases.
First, plaintiffs must prove that they were treated differently because of a protected
criteria such as sex. Id. at 802. If successful, the burden then shifts to the defendants
to prove that the practice had a legitimate business purpose. Id. at 803. Plaintiffs
then have the opportunity to show that defendant's asserted purpose was not valid,
but was a means of discrimination. Id. at 804; see also Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (when female employee claimed failure to
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Thus, sexual harassment in the workplace encompasses any act, 2 '
sexual in nature, which interferes with a woman's 2 2 job performance,
makes her feel uncomfortable, or harms her chances of advance-
ment. 12
3
get promoted and subsequent termination of employment was predicated upon her
gender, defendant bore burden of explaining non-discriminatory reasons for such
actions). However, in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the Court
of Appeals for the Distict of Columbia Circuit held that in sexual harassment
cases, the McDonnell Douglas standards of proof should be relaxed in favor of
the plaintiffs, due to the more difficult task of proving that sex, plus failure to
submit to sexual advances, were factors of the discrimination. Id. at 951. The
Bundy test requires that the employer prove, by "clear and convincing evidence,"
that any denied job benefit was based on non-discriminatory grounds. Id. at 953.
In cases alleging disparate impact, plaintiffs are merely required to show that a
seemingly neutral employment practice produced a significant adverse impact on a
particular race or class. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). Proof
of disparate motive is not required. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977). In Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975), the
Supreme Court set up a three-part schedule of the order and allocation of proof
to be used in discriminatory impact cases, in which an employer must prove that
any disparate impact is job related. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431-32 (1971). Therefore, depending on the facts of a particular case, sexual
discrimination can be found to violate Title VII under either a discriminatory
treatment or impact theory.
121. In Bundy, the Supreme Court held that a pattern of sexually degrading
insults would be sufficient to violate Title VII by creating a discriminatory envi-
ronment. 641 F.2d at 943-45. However, it is not the speech itself, but rather a
pattern of such speech that would constitute an act of discriminatory treatment.
Id. at 944. The court cites cases involving ethnic and racial slurs to support this
proposition. For example, in Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc.,
568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977), the court held that isolated incidents of ethnic
slurs were not sufficient to violate Title VII. However, courts have noted that
patterns of racial slurs could violate Title VII entitlement to a nondiscriminatory
environment. See United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631-35
(W.D.N.Y. 1978) (number of instances of racial slurs and harassment against black
police officers demonstrated working environment heavily charged with racial dis-
crimination); Steadman v. Hundley, 421 F. Supp. 53, 57 (N.D. I11. 1976) (allegations
that defendant made racial slurs against him, gave him menial duties and spoke
adversely of him to others provided sufficient information to withstand motion to
dismiss Title VII claim).
122. Although sexual harassment is based on the protection of women, courts
have noted that male employees may also be victims of sexual harassment. In
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court noted that
if, for example, a female supervisor imposed sexual advances on a male subordinate,
the same problem would exist as when a male superior submits a female employee
to sexual advances; the subordinate would be faced with a situation that, but for
his or her sex, the employee would not have faced. Id.
123. 29 CFR § 1604.11(a)-(g) (1980); see Vermeulen, Employer Liability Under
Title VII for Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Employees, 10 CAP. U.L. REv.
499, 499-505 (1981). Vermeulen discusses the "spectrum of conduct" incorporated
in the term sexual harassment. For example, sexual harassment can be manifested
by touches, jokes, slurs against women, or dress codes which require women to
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As Justice Goldberg noted in Rogers v. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission,'2 the parameters of discrimination change
with the times.125 Civil rights, once limited to the contractual and
property rights of blacks, 26 now encompass rights based upon race,
religion, national origin, and sex. 27 The Minneapolis ordinance raises
the question of whether the civil rights concept should be extended
to include discrimination caused by pornography.
IV. Does Pornography Violate Civil Rights?
Pornography, as defined by the Minneapolis ordinance, 28 differs
from the common definition of pornography which includes
"erotica' '1 29 and "obscenity."' 30 Proponents of the Minneapolis or-
dinance do not argue that all sexually explicit presentations violate
the civil rights of women; rather, they maintain that only sexually
explicit material which subordinates women violates women's civil
rights. "I
Throughout the history of civil rights, discrimination has been
wear revealing clothing. Id. at 499. In SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN,
supra note 110, at 25-55, author Catherine MacKinnon devotes chapter three to
an examination of what sexual harassment is as reported by women who have
experienced it. MacKinnon reports that sexual harassment takes physical forms,
such as touches, as well as verbal forms, such as repeated comments regarding a
woman's body. Id. at 29.
124. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (employers
who segregated their patients according to race discriminated against Spanish-
surnamed employee by making her uncomfortable on job).
125. Id. at 238. See supra note 117 for a quote from Justice Goldberg's opinion.
126. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for language of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.
127. See supra notes 61-101 and accompanying text for an analysis of the rights
that are encompassed by the Civil War Amendments and federal legislation.
128. See supra notes 20-46 and accompanying text for language of the Minneapolis
ordinance.
129. Erotica depicts sexuality. TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY
24 (Lederer ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as TAKE BACK THE NIGHT]. The ordinance
does not restrict material that simply exudes sexuality; rather it only restricts material
that subordinates women. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Minneapolis ordinance.
130. Obscenity, in common parlance, refers to that which is offensive or dis-
gusting, based upon generally accepted principles of what is acceptable. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1557 (1976). This definition is far broader than
that of the ordinance; the dictionary definition incorporates a moral measurement
of what is socially appropriate, whereas the ordinance does not. Although material
which is pornography under the ordinance might very well be obscene, the converse
is not true.
131. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for the Minneapolis Ordinance,
§ 3 to add Minn. § 139.20 (gg)(1)(i)-(ix), which defines pornography.
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defined as the unequal treatment 3 2 of a person based on that person's
class 133 or a characteristic of that class.' 34 The Minneapolis City
Council found that pornography promotes bigotry and contempt
which leads to discrimination based on sex 35 in areas such as em-
ployment, education and participation in public life. 3 6 The City
Council's assertion that pornography discriminates against women
because of the negative ideas it promotes therefore represents a
departure from the prior application of civil rights laws.
Pornography works in much the same way as racial or ethnic
slurs in that it promotes bigotry and antisocial behavior.' 37 Yet, even
the broad 1964 Act'38 does not regulate the content of offensive speech
or literature.13 9 The 1964 Act regulates only unequal treatment by an
132. See supra notes 57-101 and accompanying text for an analysis of what
constitutes discrimination under the Civil War Amendments and federal legislation.
133. "Class" refers to an individual's race, religion, color, national origin or
sex. For example, § 2000e-2 of Title VII makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate against an individual regarding a condition of employment
because of the person's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (1982).
134. Pregnancy, for example, is a characteristic of the female class, and is
encompassed within Title VII. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-
955, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act clarifies that "because
of sex" or "on the basis of sex" as used in Title VII includes "because of or on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions." Appendix-
Questions and Answers on The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-
955, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), reprinted in 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1981).
135. Pornography harms the civil rights of women on the basis of their sexuality.
It is arguable, under MacKinnon's "inequality" theory of sex discrimination cases,
that women's sexuality is a characteristic of the class of women, because the
sexuality of each sex is treated differently. See supra note 110 for a discussion of
the inequality theory.
136. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text for the Minneapolis City
Council's Special Findings on the harms created by the bigotry and contempt that
pornography promotes.
137. In Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982), author Richard
Delgado enumerates the psychological, sociological, and political effects of racial
insults. He demonstrates that racial insults keep minority groups from assimilating
into the economic and social mainstream of society. Id. at 135-49. The harm
suffered by minorities through racial insults is similar to the harms that women
suffer from pornography. Each group is kept at an unequal position in careers
and social opportunities due to the degrading remarks that make people believe
that these groups are inferior. See id. at 135-49.
138. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
139. Id. Ojala, The Minneapolis Pornography Ordinance- Censorship Not Civil
Rights, 53 HENNEPIN LAW. 10 (Mar.-Apr. 1984) (Minneapolis ordinance presents
no new approach to civil rights, but rather seeks to suppress popular speech).
Under Title VII, racial comments that are merely part of a casual conversation or
that are sporadic do not constitute a violation. EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight
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employer. 40
Arguably, pornography causes discrimination against women. Dur-
ing public hearings on the Minneapolis ordinance, 14  one woman
testified that pornography displayed at her job forced her to transfer
to a less desirable position.142 Pictures from pornographic magazines 43
decorated the co-ed employee lunchroom, causing her to suffer feelings
of discomfort and humiliation. 4 4 When she removed the pornography,
Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D. Minn. 1980) (black employee proved he
was subjected to vicious and frequent instances of racial barassment through repeated
"nigger" references and racially motivated pranks). Rather, the working environment
must be heavily charged with racial discrimination before a violation will be found.
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (employee's psychological,
as well as economic, interests are protected under Title VII), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972). The courts require that racially abusive language be "repeated," "con-
tinuous," or "prolonged" in order to violate Title VII. Walker v. Ford Motor Co.,
684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (lth Cir. 1982) (employee's repeated use of terms "nigger rigged"
and "black-ass" was severe enough to affect psychological well-being of black
employees in violation of Title VII); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905
(11 th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff entitled to retrial on claim that sexual harassment, through
repeated sexual inquiries, vulgarities and advances over two-year period created distress-
ing environment). Therefore, it is not the offensive speech but the permitting of
a discriminatory work environment to exist, created through patterns of offensive
speech, which violates Title VII. In cases of discriminatory environment due to racial
slurs, the action is against the employer for allowing or condoning the discriminatory
treatment. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see supra note
140 and accompanying text.
140. Title VII defines "employer" to include "any agent of such a person" (i.e.
employer). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). Courts have held that an employer is liable
for sexual harassment by a supervisor where the employer has actual or constructive
knowledge of it. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tompkins
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977) (employer liable
where knew or had constructive knowledge of sexual harassment and failed to act
quickly to correct). Constructive knowledge can be found where a discriminatory
work enviromment exists. See Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894,
935 (D.N.J. 1978) (employer found to have constructive knowledge of sexual
harassment due to pervasiveness of discriminatory environment). In Miller v. Bank
of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979), the court held an employer liable for
sexual harassment by a supervisor under a respondeat superior theory, even though
the employer had no knowledge of the harassment. Finally, the EEOC guidelines
specify that employers are to be held liable for sexual harassment by supervisors.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1981).
141. Testimony, Public Hearings on Ordinance to Add Pornography as Discrim-
ination Against Women, Minneapolis Government Operations Committee (Dec. 12,
1983).
142. Testimony, Session II, reprinted in Baldwin, Pornography: More Than a
Fantasy, 53 HENNEPIN LAW. 8, 9 (Mar.-Apr. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Pornography:
More Than a Fantasy].
143. The magazines included Hustler, Playboy, Penthouse, and Oui.
144. Testimony, Session II, reprinted in Pornography: More Than a Fantasy,
supra note 142, at 9. She testified that: "It was very uncomfortable ... to go
down there and have dinner and lunch with about twenty men and here is me
[sic] facing all these pictures ... it finally got to the point where I could no
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her male co-workers retaliated against her. 14 5 Proponents of the Min-
neapolis ordinance rely on such testimony in arguing that a civil action
should exist to combat the pornography itself.'4 6 However, it is the
employer who perpetrates the unequal treatment; pornography is merely
the tool used to effect the discrimination. Under Title VII,' 4, this woman
may allege a civil rights violation, but the action would be against the
employer for condoning a discriminatory work environment rather than
against the manufacturer or distributor of the pornography.' 4 8
Pornography does not treat women unequally as do all other civil
rights violations. 49 Rather, pornography fosters negative stereotypes
which cause people to treat women in an inferior manner. 50 The
unequal treatment of women fostered by pornography constitutes
the civil wrong, not the pornography itself.
V. Pornography and the First Amendment
The first amendment unambiguously declares that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."'' However,
the Supreme Court has held that speech is not an absolute right.'52
longer tolerate sitting there and realizing that all of these men were there, I felt
totally naked in front of these men." Id.
145. Id. Her co-workers smashed her car, verbally abused her, and boycotted
her at work.
146. See id.
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
148. See supra notes 139, 140 and accompanying text.
149. The sexual inequality of pornography is that 90076 of it is directed against
women. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 1984, at 40.
150. See supra note 46 and accompanying text for the Minneapolis City Council's
Special Findings on the harms created by the bigotry and contempt that pornography
promotes.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
152. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) ("the First and Fourteenth
Amendments have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual
to speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any
circumstances that he chooses"); see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,
368 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919). The Justices have
been divided on whether the right to free speech is absolute. See NowAK, supra
note 63, at 866. Justices Black and Douglas adhere to the absolutist view of free
speech, although it has not been accepted by the Supreme Court. Id. at 866.
Conversely, Justice Harlan was a proponent of the balancing view, whereby the
court balances the interests in protecting certain forms of speech. Id. at 866-67.
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Exceptions to the first amendment's protection exist where the harm
caused by the speech overrides the value of free expression'53 and
where speech is of little or no social value. 154 Proponents of the
Minneapolis ordinance argue that the harm created by pornography
classifies it as a form of unprotected speech.'55 However, in American
Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 56 the federal district court in
Indianapolis held that that city's anti-pornography ordinance was
an unconstitutional regulation of speech protected by the first amend-
ment.157
A. Pornography and Exceptions to the First Amendment
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,'58 the Supreme Court listed
certain forms of speech traditionally held to be unprotected by the
first amendment, including "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace."' 5 9 In addition, the Court has held that commercial
speech which is misleading or deceptive 60 or which advances an
illegal activity 6' is unprotected speech. In 1982, the Court extended
153. Such harm exists in the case of libel and fighting words. See infra notes
164-65 and accompanying text.
154. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
155. See Brief of Linda Marchiano, supra note 18, at 13-19.
156. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
157. Id. at 1337. Additionally, the court found the ordinance to call for unlawful
prior restraint. Id. at 1340-41. This aspect of the court's decision is outside the
scope of this Note.
158. 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (state statute forbidding persons from using offensive
speech which directly tends to incite acts of violence in public place does not
substantially hinder free speech).
159. Id. at 572 (footnote omitted). In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-
85 (1957), the Supreme Court held that obscenity is not constitutionally protected
speech because obscenity is without any redeeming social importance. However, in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973), the Supreme Court altered the
Roth standard and held that speech must lack serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value to be obscene. In Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57
(1952), the Court held that libelous, insulting and fighting words are unprotected.
However, some constitutional protection has been afforded libelous speech. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, (1964) (to get damages for defamatory
falsehood regarding official conduct, public official must prove "actual malice"
because protection of free political discussion is fundamental principle of our
democratic system). In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam),
the Court held that speech which is aimed at inciting "imminent lawless action"
and is likely to produce such action, is unprotected.
160. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (commercial speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading to
be protected under first amendment).
161. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
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the scope of unprotected speech to include material that visually
depicts children engaged in sexual conduct.
161
The speech attacked under the anti-pornography ordinance is not
encompassed by any of these pre-defined categories. Although evi-
dence indicates that pornography causes physical harm to women,
163
it does not present the immediate potential for injury which is
associated with "fighting words.' ' 64 Pornography is not libelous
because it is not a "defamatory falsehood."'' 65 Nor is pornography
commercial speech which is "expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience. "166
Furthermore, pornography, as defined by the ordinance, does not
fall squarely within the parameters of the obscenity category. In
Miller v. California,67 the Supreme Court devised the following
three-part test to identify legally obscene material:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct[168 ] specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 69
376 (1973) (ordinance prohibiting newspaper advertising system of sex-designated
job opportunity column, in violation of prohibition against sex discrimination, does
not violate first amendment).
162. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (New York statute prohibiting
distribution of depictions of children engaged in sexual performances does not
violate first amendment).
163. See infra notes 187-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
pornography causes physical harm to women.
164. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Supreme Court
defined the test for "fighting words" to be "what men of common intelligence
would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight."
Id. at 573. Thus, "fighting words" create potential and likely imminency of action.
165. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Alabama law
applied in the case defined libel per se as words that "tend to injure a person
... in his reputation" or to "bring [him] into public contempt." Id. at 263.
166. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980).
167. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (conviction due to mailing sexually explicit material
deemed obscene must be considered according to forum community test of what
constitutes obscenity).
168. The Court states that this test refers only to materials which depict or
describe "hard core" sexual conduct. Id. at 27.
169. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S.
ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY ORDINANCE
The Minneapolis ordinance, by making actionable' 70 speech which
subordinates women as a class,' 7 ' attacks material that is non-obscene
under the Miller test. 72 Although some sexually explicit material
may fall within both the Miller test and the ordinance, other de-
pictions would fall only under the broader ordinance test. 73 Thus,
material that the Supreme Court has found to be protected speech
nevertheless would be actionable under the Minneapolis ordinance.
Proponents of the ordinance argue that a new exception to protected
speech, like that recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
New York v. Ferber,'74 should be carved out for pornography. In
Ferber, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute prohibiting
the distribution of child pornography."' The Court stated that "the
States are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic
Ct. 2794, 2799 (1985), the Supreme Court held that materials must do more than
provoke "lust" or other normal sexual desires to be characterized as "obscene."
170. The Miller test defines obscenity as a criminal legal term, whereas the
ordinance seeks to facilitate civil actions against pornography. Compare Miller, 413
U.S. at 18 ("[tlhis case involves the application of a State's criminal obscenity
statute . .. ") with MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 2 to amend § 141.60
(Civil Action, judicial review and enforcement).
171, See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
172. In American Booksellers, the court stated a number of reasons why the
scope of the Indianapolis ordinance extended beyond the definition of obscenity
as defined by Miller, including: (1) the Indianapolis ordinance did not speak of a
"community standard" or limit the restriction to material that appealed to the
"prurient interest;" (2) the restrictions of the Indianapolis ordinance are not limited
to "patently offensive" materials; (3) there is no provision in the Indianapolis
ordinance for material that is pornographic but has "serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value;" and (4) the Indianapolis ordinance does not limit itself to
"hard core sexual conduct." American Booksellers, 598 F. Supp. at 1332.
173. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. MacKinnon and Dworkin argue
that the approach used in the ordinance is better than that used in obscenity laws
for the following reasons:
(1) obscenity laws are inconsistent and create confusion about pornography because
they wrongfully identify the harm; they seek to stop that which offends asthetic
values rather than stopping the actual injury and abuse caused by pornography;
(2) obscenity is a social value judgment, whereas the sexually explicit subordination
of women is concrete;
(3) obscenity suggests that women's bodies are dirty, as is sex, whereas the
ordinance is not making moral judgments;
(4) courts have difficulty enforcing obscenity laws because there is no evidence
of the harm of obscenity, yet evidence from the hearings, see supra notes 141-46;
infra notes 193-95, demonstrates that pornography harms the status and treatment
of women.
Memorandum to Minneapolis City Council by Catherine A. MacKinnon and
Andrea Dworkin, briefly addressing questions raised about the ordinance (Dec. 26,
1983).
174. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). See Brief of Linda Marchiano, supra note 18, at 13-
19 for proponents' argument to carve out a new exception to free speech.
175. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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depictions of children"' 7 6 due to the state's compelling interest in
protecting minors from the harms of pornography.
17
The Ferber decision emphasizes, as does the Minneapolis ordi-
nance, 78 that pornography creates harm and is of little social value. 1
79
The Ferber Court did not employ the Miller test of legal obscenity 8 °
because that test did "not reflect the State's particular and more
compelling interest"'' in preventing pornography when children are
involved. Proponents of the Minneapolis ordinance argue that women
need protection because pornography imposes on women as a class
the very conditions of vulnerability and lack of power that char-
acterize children. 8 2 However, children, due to their inherent vul-
nerability, are entitled to more stringent protection than women
suffering similar harm.8 3
176. Id. at 756.
177. The Supreme Court advanced the following five reasons for upholding the
statute: (1) the states have a compelling interest in protecting the well-being of its
minors; (2) the distribution of child pornography is related to the sexual abuse of
children; (3) the advertising and selling of child pornography provides an economic motive
for its production; (4) the value of child pornography is "exceedingly modest, if not
de minimis;" and (5) the decision is not incompatible with earlier decisions that allow
the regulation of speech based on its content. Id. at 756-64.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the state's interest in
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor" is "com-
pelling." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (though
state's interest in protecting minors is compelling, it does not justify rule excluding
public from trials of sex-offenses where victim is minor). Even in the first amendment
area, the state's interest in protecting children can override protected constitutional
rights. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (FCC warranted in taking
action against radio programming containing indecent language because broadcasting
is easily accessible to children); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)
(permissible for state statute to limit sale of sexually explicit material to minors);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute forbidding minor to sell
religious literature on street upheld against freedom of speech and freedom of
religion claims).
178. See supra notes 20-46 and accompanying text.
179. 458 U.S. 747, 759-63 (1982).
180. See supra note 168 and accompanying text for the Miller test.
181. 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982).
182. Pornography: More Than a Fantasy, supra note 142, at 25 (coercion that
children suffer through pornography is same coercion that pornography forces on
women).
183. In American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind.
1984), the court stated that women cannot be afforded the same protection as
children because "[a]dult women generally have the capacity to protect themselves
from participating in and being personally victimized by pornography .... ." Id.
at 1333. Although women are often forced into pornography for financial survival,
they are more able to control their entry into pornography than are children. See
TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, supra note 129, at 45-47 for an interview with an ex-
pornography model who tells of the financial necessities that keep women trapped
in pornography.
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B. The State Interest in Regulating Pornography
The state has an interest in protecting its citizens from harm. In
Ginsberg v. New York, 84 the Supreme Court held that a state
legislature may act to ban certain behavior, including speech, where
it is believed to cause harm, even without scientific proof of the
causal link between the behavior and the harm.'85 However, the state
can act legislatively to protect its citizens at the expense of a con-
stitutional right such as free speech only when the state's interest
in regulation is compelling. 186
Pornography is dominated by certain recurring themes:' 7 (1) the
sexual portrayal of violence;'88 (2) the image of the strong male and
the passive, weak female who desires to be dominated;8 9 (3) the
184. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
185. Id. at 642-43. The Supreme Court stated, in relation to the hypothesized
causal link between obscenity and harmful effects on youths, that it does not
require of legislatures "scientifically certain criteria of legislation." Id. citing Noble
State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911) (insignificant taking of private
property where it protects public is constitutional, although not certain at what
point police power is limited by Constitution). In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957) (statute prohibiting mailing of obscene material upheld), the Supreme
Court held that obscene materials are not protected by the first amendment, and
allowed a state legislature to act on a hypothetical conclusion that obscenity is
harmful, in order to protect "the social interest in order and morality." Id. at
485, quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis
added in Roth); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973)
(although no conclusive proof that obscene material causes antisocial behavior,
legislature of Georgia could determine that such causal connection existed in order
to enjoin obscene films).
186. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
[Gleneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of
speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been
regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade
Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found justified by
subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitu-
tionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental
interest involved.
Id. at 50-51.
187. Hommel, Images of Women in Pornography and Media, 8 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 207 (1978-1979) [hereinafter cited as Hommel]. This article is
the text that accompanied a slide show prepared by Women Against Violence in
Pornography and Media (WAVPM). It provides a startling look at the images of
women portrayed in pornography.
188. Most pornography combines violence and sex, be it through depictions of
kidnapping, torture, hanging or murder. Id. at 210.
189. See, for example, the excerpt from Slave Girls: Whipped, Tied and Trained,
where a man whips a woman and shouts "[y]ou take it, take your punishment,
bitch, you take all of it, you slut." The woman is shown as deriving sexual pleasure
from the whipping and verbal degradation. See Brief of Linda Marchiano, supra
note 18, at Appendix C.
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comic portrayal of rape and battery;1 9° and (4) the image of women
as inhuman sexual objects 91 and natural prostitutes. 192 These images,
repeated over and over, create a warped view of sexuality which is
transmuted into violence and discrimination against women.193
190. A fashion feature in Vogue magazine, December 1975, portrayed a man
slapping a woman and the woman screaming in pain. The text of the magazine
defined this as chic and "in." See Hommel, supra note 187, at 213.
191. The cover of the album Ain't That a Bitch? by Johnny Guitar Watson
portrays two women at his feet, both wearing collars and leashes; the couch on
which he is sitting and the dog in the picture provide phallic imagery. Id. at 212.
192. In a magazine called Little Girls, a girl returning from parochial school is
seduced by a man. She describes their departure, saying "[hie handed me some
money as I left; far out, that'll buy a lot of cookies." Id. at 208-09.
193. Donnerstein & Linz, Sexual Violence in the Media: A Warning, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Jan. 1984, at 14. The article describes the ongoing study, entitled "Effects
of Media Exposure on Attitudes of Aggression" conducted by Donnerstein and
Linz on massive exposure to commercially released sexually violent films, including
"Texas Chainsaw Massacre" and "Maniac" (both R-rated) (an R-rating specifies
"restricted: youngsters under seventeen admitted only if accompanied by parent or
adult guardian;" see E. KATZ, THE FILM ENCYCLOPEDIA 949 (1979)). The study's
findings show that even brief exposure can: (1) increase the viewer's acceptance
of the belief that women want to be raped; (2) increase the willingness of a man
to say that he would commit rape; (3) increase aggressive behavior by men against
women in a laboratory setting; and (4) decrease male sensitivity to the plight of
the rape victim. Donnerstein & Linz, Sexual Violence in the Media: A Warning,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan. 1984, at 15. This study was relied upon heavily by
MacKinnon and Dworkin in the drafting of the ordinance. Donnerstein testified
to the results of the study at the Government Operations Committee hearings.
Press Release announcing the hearings, Dec. 12, 1983. Similar findings were reported
in Malamuth & Check, Penile Tumescence and Perceptual Responses to Rape as
a Function of Victim's Perceived Reactions in PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP at
257 (1983). For an extensive bibliography of studies demonstrating the effects of
pornography on violence against women, see Brief of Linda Marchiano, supra note
18, at Appendix B. In 1970, the federal government, after two years of investigation,
concluded that exposure to pornography does not seriously promote antisocial
behavior. THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970)
[hereinafter cited as THE REPORT]. THE REPORT concludes that, at most, exposure
to sexual stimuli temporarily increases the frequency of masturbation, coitus, erotic
dreams and conversations about sexual matters. Id. at 194. However, THE REPORT
has been faulted on many grounds. For example, the study lacks evidence of the
effects of pornography on the young, and the study was written prior to the advent
of much of the violent pornography that exists today. See M. YAFFE & E. NELSON,
THE INFLUENCE OF PORNOGRAPHY ON BEHAVIOR xiii (1982). Additionally, THE REPORT
did not limit its research to "pornography" but includes much of the innocuous
forms of sexually explicit material. TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, supra note 129, at
189. Whether or not conclusive findings to link pornography and antisocial behavior
can be documented in a laboratory, the testimony of abused women cannot be
ignored. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
In a nationwide poll conducted for the A.B.A. Journal, 70% of the lawyers
polled (6707o of the male lawyers, and 8907o of the female lawyers) said they believed
that some pornography discriminates against women, and 66% (64% of the male
lawyers, and 82% of the female lawyers) felt that some pornography contributes
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The most obvious victims of pornography are the models portrayed
in pornographic films, shows and pictures. 94 Yet the cast of victims
does not end there. Men take pornography home to their mates and
force these women to act it out. 195 Women, forced to witness and
participate in pornographic acts, are made to feel worthless and
dehumanized. 96 On a political level, 97 pornography acts as a form
to violent crimes against women. 71 A.B.A. J. 46 (March 1985). Additionally, a
Newsweek national poll found that three out of four adults agreed that pornography
can lead to a loss of respect, as well as acts of sexual violence and rape against
women. NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 1985, at 60.
194. In "Then and Now: An Interview with a Former Pornography Model in
TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, supra note 129, at 45-59, an ex-model told of the great
amount of physical and emotional abuse forced on her as a model. She spoke of
the vaginal trichomoniasis suffered by the models as a result of the filthy working
conditions, the rape, the injuries, including broken bones and rope burns, from
being put in physically dangerous positions, and the emotional abuse associated
with being treated like a "piece of meat." Id. at 54-57. At the extreme end of
the harm caused to pornography models are "snuff" films which purport to show
the actual sexual rape and murder of women. LaBelle, Snuff-The Ultimate in
Woman-Hating in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, supra note 129, at 272-78. Supposedly
in a movie of this type filmed in Argentina, a woman was actually murdered on
camera for the sexual thrill of the audience. Id. at 276.
195. Staff members of women's shelters, sexual assault centers and mental health
facilities testified at public hearings that pornography is used as an instruction
manual for techniques of sexual, psychological and physical battery of women at
home. Testimony, Public Hearings on Ordinance to Add Pornography as Discrim-
ination Against Women, Minneapolis Government Operations Committee (Dec. 12,
1983), reprinted in part in Pornography: More Than a Fantasy, supra note 142,
at 9. Individual women testified as to how men would bring pornography home
and force them, through threats of physical harm, to perform the acts done in
the "dirty" books. Id. One woman testified: "He would read the pornography
like a textbook, like a journal. In fact, when he asked me to be bound, when he
finally convinced me to do it, he read in the magazine how to tie the knots and
how to bind me in a way that I couldn't get out." Id. In addition to testimony,
emergency rooms reported an increase in the number of throat rapes following the
opening of the movie "Deep Throat." Brief of Linda Marchiano, supra note 18,
at 18 n.(*).
196. During the Public Hearings conducted by the Minneapolis Government
Operations Committee, one woman testified to her feelings of degradation:
[Ilnitially I started arguing that the women on stage looked very devastated
like they were disgusted and hated it. I felt disgusted and devastated
watching it. I was told by those men if I wasn't as smart as I was and
if I would be more sexually liberated and more sexy, that I would get
along a lot better in the world and that they and a lot of other men
would like me more .... About this time when things were getting really
terrible and I was feeling very suicidal and worthless as a person, at
that time any dreams that I had of a career in medicine was just totally
washed away. I could not think of myself any more as a human being.
Testimony, reprinted in Pornography: More Than a Fantasy, supra note 142, at
9.
197. Feminists often analyze pornography according to the political forces behind
it. Typically, liberals view obscenity as part of free speech, while conservatives feel
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of oppression; it terrorizes women, keeping them under the domi-
nation of men. 9
Pornography clearly has harmful effects. Yet the evidence of the
harm created does not rise to the level of an interest sufficiently
compelling to override the right to free speech. 199 The Supreme Court
has stated that racist and anti-semitic speech cannot be suppressed
regardless of the subordination and prejudice that it inspires. 2°°
Similarly, courts continue to hold that unless otherwise protected
speech actually incites lawless action, the producers of the speech
cannot be held liable for any of the harmful effects caused by the
speech.
20 1
that obscenity is not protected under the first amendment. See Yeamans, A Political-
Legal Analysis of Pornography in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, supra note 129, at 247-
50.
198. See Dworkin, Pornography: The New Terrorism, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 215 (1978-1979) (pornography is propaganda which terrorizes women through
rape, wife-beating and sexual abuse).
199. The amount of evidence of harm required depends upon the type of speech
involved. Note, Anti-Pornography Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 460, 476-80 (1984). Speech which is considered to be of lesser value, such
as libel or obscenity, can be restricted on the basis of evidence showing an arguable
correlation to harm. See supra notes 163-86 and accompanying text. However,
pornography is more similar to defamation and speech which, if imitated, could
cause harm. In these "protected" categories the courts require stronger proof of
a chain of causation to create a compelling state interest that would override the
free speech interest. See infra notes 200, 201 and accompanying text.
200. See generally National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432
U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam) (use of swastikas and display of Nazi uniforms by
National Socialist Party of America in predominantly Jewish town could not be
enjoined); on remand, 69 111. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Ohio statute aimed at Ku Klux Klan activity unconstitutional
because it punished advocacy of use of force which is short of inciting lawless
action); Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968)
(ex parte order stopping "white supremacist" group from making racist speeches
found unconstitutional); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (ordinances restricting
National Socialist Party of America from assembling in predominantly Jewish town
declared unconstitutional), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). In these cases, the courts
distinguished offensive speech from speech that is considered to be of lesser value,
such as obscenity or libel.
201. Many cases have been brought in which the imitation of broadcasted material
resulted in harm; each case has held that the broadcasters cannot be held liable.
Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (negligence
and strict liability suit claiming that publication of article on "autoerotic as-
phyxiation" caused death of plaintiff's brother and son); Zamora v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (claim brought on behalf of
minor alleging that he became involuntarily addicted to violence through excessive
viewing on television and as result murdered his neighbor); Olivia N. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981) (nine year old "artifi-
cally raped" with bottle four days after assailants saw artificial rape scene in Born Inno-
cent on NBC), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108, reh. denied, 458 U.S. 1132 (1982); DeFilippo
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As Justice Holmes noted in his dissenting opinion in United States
v. Schwimmer, 02 "if there is any principle of the Constitution that
more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the
principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with
us but freedom for the thought that we hate. ' 23 Passage of the
Minneapolis ordinance would create legislative "line-drawing" in the
area of morality; legislatures would have the authority to regulate
all speech that they deemed harmful or offensive. 204 The ordinance
would have a "chilling effect"2 °5 on free speech since broadcasters2°6
and producers would be forced into self-censorship to protect them-
selves from lawsuits. 20 7 As the court noted in American Booksellers
v. National Broadcast Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1872 (R.I. 1982) (wrongful
death action brought by parents of thirteen-year-old who accidentially hanged himself
while emulating stunt performed on Tonight Show).
However, in Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123
Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975), the California Supreme Court held that a radio station could
be liable for the death of two motorists killed in an automobile accident. Id. at
50-51, 539 P.2d at 42, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472. The accident occurred as two teens
who were participating in a radio contest sped to locate a disc jockey who was
driving around Los Angeles. The court held that there existed no first amendment
bar to the liability of the radio station "for the foreseeable results of a broadcast
which created an undue risk of harm .... The First Amendment does not sanction
the infliction of physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than act."
Id. at 48, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472. No similar incitement theory
can be made for pornography.
202. 279 U.S. 644 (1929) (dictum), overruled, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
203. Id. at 654-55.
204. The court noted in American Booksellers that if the proponents' argument
were accepted, legislative bodies would gain support to enact legislation prohibiting
other "unfair expression" which causes discrimination, including racial and ethnic
slurs and derogatory remarks about the handicapped. American Booksellers, 598
F. Supp. at 1335.
205. The "chilling effect doctrine" refers to any law or practice which severely
discourages the exercise of constitutional rights. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 217 (5th
ed. 1979). The "chilling effect doctrine" evolved from the Court's decision in
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969) (threat to impose criminal
punishment where it had been set aside due to constitutional error would have
chilling effect on exercise of constitutional rights).
206. The rights of broadcasters are unique in that they must be weighed against
the first amendment rights of the viewers to have access to a plethora of ideas
provided by the limited broadcast channels. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) (must balance first amendment
right to receive social and political views against broadcasters' right to refuse editorial
advertisements).
207. As the Court noted in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), vague
restrictions of free speech cannot exist because they threaten to stop speech: "[t]hese
freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society.
The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions." Id. at 433. Such self-censorship would violate the right
of viewers to a "marketplace of ideas," as first described by Justice Holmes in
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Association, the Indianapolis ordinance, if found constitutional,
"would signal so great a potential encroachment upon First Amend-
ment freedoms that the precious liberties reposed within those guar-
antees would not survive." 0 s
VI. Recommendations
The first amendment guarantee of free speech is the very vehicle
by which pornography should be attacked. Opponents of pornog-
raphy must make concerted efforts to decry pornography 2 9 and
educate the public regarding pornography's harmful effects. 210 Spe-
cifically, opponents of pornography must aim their educational ef-
forts at the people who do business with pornographers."' If the
business community turns its back on pornographers, the industry
will become less lucrative and, thus, less attractive to producers and
distributors .212
Beyond education, opponents of pornography should employ the
legal tools presently available, such as obscenity laws213 and zoning
his dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) ("best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market .... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.").
208. American Booksellers, 598 F. Supp. at 1336.
209. The concerted efforts of Rochester Women Against Violence Against Women
(RWAVAW) is an inspiring example of the power of concerted effort and education.
See Gever & Hall, Fighting Pornography in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, supra note
129, at 279-85. The group displayed messages against pornography, picketed theatres,
spoke out to educate the public, reprinted articles, and distributed leaflets to make
the horrors of pornography known. Id. However, the group also engaged in illegal
activities, such as destruction of property, which this Note does not advocate.
Private action can be effective. For example, in a panel discussion entitled
Regulation of Pornography, reprinted in 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 281,
287 (1978-1979), Dean Norman Redlich pointed to the effective use of the boycott
by followers of Senator McCarthy during the 1950's.
210. Attempts to demonstrate the harmful effects of pornography must start by
shattering the myths created by pornography. See supra notes 187-93 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the myths that pornography perpetuates.
211. Pornography is a thriving industry. In 1978, the pornography industry grossed
an estimated four billion dollars a year; however, law enforcement officials speculated
that the true figure was two or three times that amount. Cook, The X-Rated
Economy, 22 FORBES 81, Sept. 18, 1978. Recent estimates put the figure at seven
billion dollars a year, which is more money than the movie and music businesses
combined. White, Pornography and Pride, ESSENCE, Sept. 1984, at186. Without
economic success, the industry would decline.
212. One way of making the business less lucrative is to make the patrons feel
uncomfortable. For example, in one Southern town, women photographed men as
they entered and exited porn shops. The women then made up Wanted Posters of
the men and plastered them all over town. Morgan, Theory and Practice: Por-
nography and Rape in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, supra note 129, at 129.
213. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of obscenity
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statutes. 21 4 Although these tools are of limited value, 21 5 their continued
use will emphasize the growing concern over the harmful effects of
pornography.
It is through concerted effort toward consciousness-raising that
the battle against pornography must be fought. The proponents of
the Minneapolis ordinance should be applauded for bringing this
issue to the attention of lawmakers -and citizens throughout the
nation. 21 6 It is a marked step in the right direction.
VII. Conclusion
The Minneapolis anti-pornography ordinance, which asserts that
pornography violates the civil rights of women, should not survive
constitutional challenge. Pornography does not treat women une-
qually and so does not violate women's civil rights. Rather, por-
nography fosters negative and degrading untruths about women and
their sexuality; these ideas are then transmuted into acts of sex
discrimination, abuse, and violence against women. Moreover, por-
nography neither falls within the traditional categories of unprotected
speech nor warrants the creation of a new category. Although por-
nography fosters ideas which cause harm to women, the state's
214. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), the Court held
that the state may prohibit exhibitions of obscenity even in the case of "adult
only" exhibitions. Id. at 69. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50 (1976), the Supreme Court went further to hold that zoning ordinances could
prohibit the concentration of adult theatres. Id. at 72-73. However, the Supreme
Court invalidated a zoning ordinance in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61 (1981), which purported to forbid all "live entertainment" in a
commercial zone. Id. at 65-66.
215. See supra note 173 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effectiveness
of obscenity laws. For a discussion of the effectiveness of zoning laws, see Friedman,
Zoning "Adult" Movies: The Potential Impact of Young v. American Mini Theatres,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (1977); Katz, Regulating Obscenity, 5 WHITTIER L. REV.
1, 123-31 (1983).
216. Since the advent of the Minneapolis ordinance, the anti-pornography debate
has been the cover story of such popular publications as Ms. magazine, Newsweek,
and The Village Voice. See Blakely, Is One Woman's Sexuality Another Woman's
Pornography?, Ms., Apr. 1985; The War Against Pornography-Feminists, Free
Speech and the Law, NEWSWEEK, March 18, 1985; Forbidden Fantasies-A Special
Issue on Pornography, 29 THE VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 16, 1984. In addition, the
Minneapolis ordinance has been the topic of nationally broadcast television talk
shows. The National Broadcasting Company (NBC) aired a Donahue segment entitled
"Violence in Movies" on September 12, 1984, in which Professors Edward Don-
nerstein and Neil Malamuth, supra note 193, discussed the effects of sexual violence
in movies, in relation to the Minneapolis ordinance. The Public Broadcasting System
(PBS) aired a Firing Line segment entitled "Women Against Pornography" on
March 8, 1985, in which Andrea Dworkin, co-drafter of the ordinance, supra note
7, debated the issues surrounding the Minneapolis ordinance.
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interest in protecting women from these harmful effects is not com-
pelling and, therefore, is insufficient to override the first amendment
guarantee of free speech. In fact, the very means by which to combat
pornography is through the free flow of ideas.
Addendum
On August 27, 1985, while this issue was going to press, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the Indianapolis
anti-pornography ordinance unconstitutional.1 7 In its affirmance of
the district court's decision, the court of appeals held that although
"[d]epictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination,'' 28
pornography is a form of protected speech, as are racial bigotry, anti-
semitism, and violence on television.2"9 The court noted that "por-
nography" under the ordinance differs from "obscenity" and therefore
cannot be similarly prohibited as a "low value" form of speech. 22 1
Winifred Ann Sandier
217. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, No. 84-3147 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 1985).
218. Id. at 11.
219. Id. at 12-13.
220. Id. at 15-16.
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